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In mid-November, President Itamar Franco called out the army to rid the Rio de Janeiro city's
teeming shantytowns, known as favelas, of the rampant drug-related crime and violence that had
reached epidemic proportions. In addition, the army is being asked to help overhaul the corruptionriddled police forces, which exacerbate Rio's crime problems. However, human rights groups have
questioned the use of the military for domestic law enforcement, and residents of the favelas have
alleged that soldiers from the elite Eastern Military Command have tortured suspects detained
during anti- crime operations. The military operations began shortly after the Nov. 15 runoff
elections for the governorship of the state of Rio de Janeiro.
The operations have targeted the drug lords who control the favelas of the city of Rio de Janeiro as
if they were fiefdoms. Organized crime has become such a serious problem in this city of 9.5 million
that it has begun to affect the lucrative tourist business. Reported assassinations in the Rio area
average 20 per day. The agreement worked out between President Franco and Rio Gov. Nilo Batista
notes that, "Crime in Rio de Janeiro, carried out by heavily armed, organized bands of delinquents
that operate illegal drug trafficking rings, has caused apprehension and insecurity and violates
citizen's fundamental rights and guarantees."
On Nov. 17, the military used tanks and military vehicles to erect roadblocks on the principal
highways leading to Rio to prevent the crime bosses from fleeing the city. According to military
spokespersons, the barricades were also intended to prevent drugs and arms from being brought
into Rio. During the following days, soldiers fanned out occupying one after another of Rio's favelas,
making arrests and carrying out searches for drugs and arms. Tanks blocked the entrances to the
favelas and helicopters circled overhead. For the most part, as the military operation heated up,
the drug traffickers, who had sufficient advance warning about the offensive, simply moved their
operations or went into hiding. In some cases, they even taunted the soldiers, turning in small
caches of obsolete and rusty weapons or setting off welcoming firecrackers from the hillsides.
As the military moved into a particular favela, the troops set up check points at the entrances,
entered the area in large numbers, and carried out searches for a day or two before withdrawing
and moving on to another favela. According to many residents, as the soldiers moved out, the drug
dealers moved back in and resumed their normal activities. Although the military operation in Rio,
which is expected to last through the rest of the year, began rather calmly and was even welcomed
by some favela residents, charges of serious abuses soon surfaced.
By Nov. 22 the Brazilian Order of Lawyers was complaining that citizens in various favelas had
been roughed up and humiliated by the military. More serious charges soon followed, including
allegations that the military tortured and beat favela residents. On Nov. 23, Gen. Roberto Camara
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Senna, in charge of the Rio operation, acknowledged that troops had committed human rights
violations, but said excesses were "inevitable." "I recognize that some civil liberties have been
restricted, but we are not a battalion of social workers," Camara Senna said. "It is impossible to
avoid excesses."
Gov. Batista, however, ordered an investigation into the allegations of abuses after a priest and
a nun from the Borel favela, a shantytown on Rio's northern outskirts, said that on Nov. 24 they
witnessed soldiers inside the parish church of San Sebastian applying electric shocks and pushing
the heads of young men into water tanks until they almost drowned. In his letter to Gen. Camara
Senna, the priest, Olinto Pegoraro, expressed support for the operation against the drug dealers, but
added, "We cannot fight violence with violence."
On Nov. 29 army minister Gen. Zenildo de Lucena promised to "rigorously punish" any military
personnel involved in torture, although earlier statements by the general hinted at links between
Pegoraro's church and the drug traffickers. Pegoraro denied that the church was tied to drug
interests. Before allegations of serious misconduct by the military surfaced, most citizens and
much of the Rio press welcomed the crackdown on crime. A survey taken on Nov. 7 and 8 by
Datafolha public opinion institute indicated that 86% of the Rio population was in favor of the
military operations, and 52% said the military should "occupy" the favelas. However, human rights
organizations called the operations a media show that endangered the lives of the 1.2 million favela
residents.
"The use of powerful weapons such as tanks, high-powered rifles, and planes will not resolve the
problem of violence," said Cecilia Coimbra, president of the Tortura Nunca Mais (Torture Never
Again) human rights group. "What Rio needs is federal intervention in its police departments, not
its slums," said Herbert de Souza, a leading human rights advocate and sociologist. "Later, we need
to mobilize community groups and social workers to combat drug trafficking and misery in the
slums." De Souza's remarks reflect a growing awareness of the extent of police corruption in Rio.
A study prepared by the armed forces secret service and presented to President Franco by Camara
Senna, who has headed operations against organized crime in Rio, said that 70% of the 11,500
member civilian police and 20% of the 30,000-member military police are corrupt. Rio's security
forces, which include the federal police in addition to the civilian and military police, are notorious
for their involvement in crime, including protecting the illegal lottery known as "jogo do bicho."
The lottery has operated freely thanks to generous payoffs and bribes to police, politicians, and
judicial authorities. Evidence supporting charges of police corruption is increasing. Eight senior
police officers, including an officer who participated in the task force planning the crime crackdown,
resigned Nov. 11 after they were accused of taking bribes from the bosses of the illegal gambling
racket in Rio. The owners of the gambling ring are suspected to have links with international drug
and arms dealers. They also own several Brazilian soccer clubs and bankroll much of Rio's annual
Carnival. The lottery employs 30,000 in Rio alone. On Nov. 15, an additional 18 police inspectors
were fired for their ties to the illegal lottery, some of whom will face criminal charges as well.
However, the corruption is so widespread that Gov. Batista was forced to postpone indefinitely
naming replacements for the fired officers, since many of those in line for promotion are also under
investigation.
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Police have also been implicated in the death squads that murder street people, including children.
Three officers are awaiting trial for the 1993 murder of eight street children who were killed as they
slept outside the famous Candelaria church in downtown Rio. In another 1993 incident, masked
intruders killed 21 residents of the Vigario Geral favela, apparently in retaliation for the murders of
two police in the favela. More recently, on Oct. 18 a police raid resulted in the deaths of 13 people
in the Nova Brasilia favela. Forensic reports indicated that 11 of the dead had been tortured and
executed. Although less tainted by allegations of corruption, the federal police have not escaped
internal problems. They are presently investigating charges that anti-narcotics agents freed a wellknown drug trafficker in exchange for weapons. In defending his record, Gov. Batista said that 200
police officers who were accused of corruption, participation in "extermination" groups, and other
crimes had been purged from the Rio police forces during the past two years. However, Gen. Senna
vowed that ridding the police of remaining corrupt members will be a top priority of the present
military operations.
In addition to the controversy about police corruption and human rights abuses by the military,
the use of the armed forces for law enforcement has raised serious questions about the military's
present and future role as well as its effectiveness in combating crime and delinquency. In both
Honduras and Colombia, troops have been used for similar purposes. However, the necessity for
such military intervention calls into question the soundness of state institutions in Latin America,
and there is a growing perception that local governments are unable to provide a safe environment
for their citizens. Critics have called the situation in Rio "mission impossible," since it is unrealistic
to expect the military to be able to round up well-entrenched drug traffickers and criminals, while
at the same time rid the police forces of the network of corrupt members who work hand in glove
with the criminal elements. Within the military some analysts are concerned that if the mission
does prove impossible, citizens may question the value of an army that, in addition to having
neither internal nor external enemies to fight, cannot provide security to the population. Some
Brazilian political observers have called the Rio operation "a war to guarantee the military's future
employment."
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